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  • #145

Closed
Open
Created May 13, 2018 by Jurre van Bergen@DrWhaxOwner

Not verifying Alice's ephemeral public keys is intentional? (Interactive DAKE)

Created by: cobratbq

Upon receiving an Identity message, we verify the public keys provided by Bob. (Point Y and public key B) However, upon receiving an Auth-R message we immediately continue using the public keys provided to us in the AUTH_R message. (See section "To verify an Auth-R message".)

Is this intentional? If so, why is this not needed, because the applications seem rather symmetric, so I don't see why one would be more trustworthy than the other.

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